Poor Leadership, Dangerous Mindsets, A Toxic Culture & Ineffective ‘Standards’: Abuse At LIFE Wirral

The BBC Panorama broadcast ‘Undercover School: Cruelty in the classroom’, which aired on 17th June 2024, covering the physical and psychological abuse at the Life Wirral School, was highly emotive and made for difficult viewing. If you have not seen it, there is a link at the foot of this post.

The International Coalition Against Restraint and Seclusion (ICARS) posted about this Panorama broadcast a day later, on the 25th of June 2024. A link to this page is also contained at the foot of this post.

NFPS also received a considerable number of communications about the Panorama broadcast, however, we received even more communications concerning the ICARS report and the RRN.

Naturally, all the comments we received mentioned the reprehensible treatment of the children under the ‘care’ of the staff at the Life Wirral school.

The fact that restraint was shown to be used in the Panorama broadcast, coupled with restraint training and the RRN being mentioned in the ICARS report, resulted in a plethora of comments and questions being asked. And rightly so!

This post aims to address many of the recurring topics and questions contained within the communications we have had this past week. The RRN will be discussed, comprehensively, later in the post.

We shall address some of the key points from the ICARS report in the following paragraphs.

ICARS wrote:

“Wirral Life’s “Physical Intervention Policy – Use of Reasonable Force” Policy reveals that staff received training from a company accredited by Bild Association of Certified Training (Bild ACT), a Bild group charity.”

The company and its director are highly respected members of the NFPS family and have been for many years. They provided training to Life Wirral staff several years ago, at a point when they were not a BILD ACT certified training provider, so the ICARS statement is inaccurate. Furthermore, they are not the current provider for the Life Wirral, who had subsequently sought and received Physical Intervention training from another provider, who are not NFPS members and use different techniques to those still shown in the Life Wirral Physical Intervention Policy.

We have spoken with the NFPS member, unlike anyone from ICARS, and having viewed the Panorama broadcast, we see no cogent reason for ICARS to risk the outstanding reputation of this company by relating their services to anything that occurred at this school.

We offered advice to our NFPS member, which was well received and, as always, NFPS will back our family members fully when they face such egregious tortious interference to their business.

ICARS also wrote:

“While the specific head/neck restraint shown on the programme is not in the policy appendix, we are concerned that the illustration of ten restraints normalises dangerous and intrusive interventions.”

Regrettably, this is a highly ignorant statement, and it is reasonable to suggest that it could only be written by someone with little, if any, operational competence in use of physical interventions; perhaps this explains why they are writing on behalf of an organisation who is completely against restraint and seclusion.

Here is some free advice to all those who are members of ICARS:

Restraint saves lives, period!

NFPS does strongly agree with ICARS when it comes to concerns about the promotion and efficacy of the RRNTS.

The ICARS publication exposes several failures associated with the implementing of BILD/RRN strategies:

“Recording and reporting, another of the six core strategies advocated by the RRN in their statement, was happening at the Life Wirral. The programme showed a staff member boasting about their abusive use of restraint on a child while recording “I guided him effectively” on the paperwork.”

Many learned professionals, across many sectors but particularly within ‘education’ and ‘health and social care’, have reported similar reporting concerns to NFPS, and sadly this is nothing new.

These include, but not limited to:

  • very serious incidents not being reported at all;
  • the deliberate obfuscating of the true nature of incidents when reporting;
  • editing reports post-submission;
  • and very recently we received information about a senior member of staff coercing a junior member of staff to change their report so that it reads less violent (red ‘Datix’ severity entry down to a green).

These are heinous revelations and clearly intended to prevent any negative consequences to the organisation, its management and its stakeholders, as a result.

Some reading this post may view negatively on these proclamations and claim hearsay. We invite any person with this view to watch the Panorama broadcast and witness for themselves the confession made by the staff member referred to in the ICARS report. Once viewed, we would then ask that they keep an open mind to reporting behaviours of the natures mentioned above; it is happening!

ICARS identified another failure:

“Regrettably, disabled and other vulnerable children continue to be disproportionately harmed within educational establishments that purport to use the approaches advocated by Bild with scant safeguards in place to protect children from physical, emotional, and psychological injury.”


“Of particular concern is the Bild Group’s use of PBS in health and social care settings, and now education, despite the controversy surrounding the use of PBS and the overwhelming condemnation of PBS by disabled advocates.”

These two statements should cause great concern to educators and Care providers who are being pushed to adopt the RRNTS.

Those who have already adopted the RRNTS may wish to review and measure the benefits and the effectiveness to service users/vulnerable persons and staff of RRNTS adoption.

We also need to address the very real issue of cost and ask if adopting the RRNTS brings justifiable benefit above what the organisation previously had. Is adopting the RRNTS taking away much needed funds which could be better spent elsewhere within the organisation?

NFPS, through another lead NFPS instructor, James Morris, offers a therapeutic intervention model to managing challenging behaviour, specifically aimed at vulnerable groups in education and social care settings. This model is called ‘BEACON’, which is an alternative to ‘PACE’, and is known positively to Ofsted. Having staff trained in the ‘BEACON’ model will allow the Care setting to claim in their ‘statement of purpose’ that they are a therapeutic service.

The ‘BEACON’ therapeutic model will be integrated as both a bolt-on option to our BTEC Level 3 Advanced Restraint Instructor Award, arguably the most legally defensible PI system available, and as a standalone course. Contact us for more information, if this is of interest to you.

And now, the RRN!

As mentioned at the beginning of this post, part of the communications we received included a great number of questions surrounding the RRN. This is very common for us here at NFPS and we have given lots of information on this previously. There will be links to previous RRN related posts at the footer of this post. Please feel free to share.

Gary Ross, who is part of the lead training team at NFPS and is primary author of the information which follows. Input is also received from another lead NFPS instructor and revered SME in the Physical Intervention landscape, Jim Snipe. Together we wanted to give you all a detailed, yet concise as possible, overview of all things RRN.

Our aim is for all who are tasked with making decisions regarding the RRNTS to be fully and accurately informed, so that failings in duty of care, such as that reported in the Panorama broadcast, can be avoided. Showing allegiance to the RRN kitemark does not guarantee you are implementing adequate duty of care and certainly does not make you immune from prosecution; there is no delegable duty of care in law.

At this point, it is prudent to mention the last contents that are of interest from the ICARS report that we wish to highlight. It is the following strong statement, which we support in its entirety:

“Where Bild/RRN and Bild ACT logos are seen on company and institution websites, paperwork, policies, and procedures, parents and carers should be able to feel reassured that their loved ones are safe in these settings. These logos should signify excellence in oversight and cultural environments. Regrettably, these logos have come to be seen by many in disability communities as promotional and sales tools, providing cover for unscrupulous companies and settings to sanitise unethical, ineffectual, and harmful practices.”

The best defence and professional standing you can make for your organisation is one which evidences competent risk assessments and is operating under legally robust policies and training systems, period! And as you will read shortly, so long as you can evidence operating in a manner which gives “regard to” the Standards, you do not need to adopt them. What you must do, is evidence that what you have in play provides adequate duty of care to all concerned.

Ok, here we go…

In the main, organisations have, and continue to be, left to their own devices to determine what is occurring within their organisations, what the threat/risk is and what needs to be done to address the threat/risk posed by violence with no support, realistic guidance and/or resources made available to assist them in the task.

Into that void has stepped several lobbying organisations with the purported aim of addressing the issues associated with violence however, they have limited their interest/remit to the issues associated with the use of restraint. They have done this is in the stated belief that if all forms of restraint can be severely curtailed, or better still, eliminated, then the issues of violence will miraculously disappear with it.

It is of interest and concern that these aims pay little or no attention to the threat/risks to staff from the violent behaviour of others but concentrate solely on the purported threat/risks to patients from the use of restraint practises by staff.

As part of this concept there is a requirement within the RRNTS to formally integrate into all restraint training programmes certified by them the ‘lived experience’ of those who have been restrained, whilst quietly ignoring or prohibiting the ‘lived experience’ of those who have been violently assaulted and/or injured [including staff, other patients and service users], nor the reasons/background as to why restraint was used on those with ‘lived experience’ in the first place.

The RRN is an integral part of that process, together with its parent organisation the British institute of Learning Difficulties [BILD] and its partner, the BILD Association of Certified Trainers [BILD ACT].

All three of these organisations are registered Charities and do not, as many mistakenly believe, constitute regulatory authorities, accrediting, or government agencies. They possess no statutory or regulatory authority, nor is there a contractual obligation on the part of Care organisations to abide by their dictates outside of a very narrow and defined remit within the mental health sector.

However, over the last few years, via a steady campaign of pressure, they have managed to persuade both central government and the regulatory authorities [CQC & NHS England] that they are the sole authority and most competent and experienced agency best able to address the issues associated with restraint [and therefore violence as a whole] within the healthcare, social and education sectors, despite having limited practical experience and/or legal authority to do so.

Added to the above are several common misconceptions associated with violence and the use of restraint within Care settings that continue to bedevil and stifle evidence-based discussion of the subject, rather than being limited to individual’s mere, and often ignorant, opinions.

The first is that, unfortunately, many working in Care, particularly within certain specialisms, as well as several external lobbying organisations and/or groups equate the use of restraint with abuse [regardless of the necessity, appropriateness, or lawfulness of its application]. In fact, to many of them there is no difference between the two and they tend to be at the forefront of concerted efforts to prohibit, eliminate, or outlaw, the use of all restraint, regardless of the practical and real implications that would have, within the healthcare, social care and education i.e. ‘Care’ sectors. ICARS appears to be one such group!

This opposition is often couched in a cloak of ethical and/or moral objections whilst unilaterally ignoring, or forgetting, the legal obligations towards all concerned by both organisations and individuals tasked with caring for people.

Whilst that attitude persists there will continue to be both a misunderstanding and an underappreciation of the issues that give rise to the need to use restraint practises and a real, as opposed to purely theoretical, appreciation of the measures necessary to address them.

Secondly, they believe that if restraint can be severely curtailed, or better still, fully eliminated from use within healthcare, then ‘violence’ per se within Care will stop.

Both the fallacy and naivety of this position should be obvious to anyone with any experience of dealing with violence within the Care sector. Restraint is a sub-set of violence, not the reverse. Further, this idea often, incorrectly, surmises that all violence within Care settings and therefore the need for the use of restraint techniques, relates solely to patients/service users/children etc. Experience indicates it does not. Therefore, as the RRNTS only deals with the use of restraint practises in relation to patients/service users/children etc., it leaves a rather gaping hole and does nothing to address the wider issue of violence within Care settings.

The third fallacy relates to the widely held double misconception that those trained and/or working in mental health settings and experienced in dealing with mental health patients are the experts in violence/restraint related issues. Whilst it is true that the vast and overwhelming body of research conducted into the issues associated with violence and restraint practises in healthcare settings [currently 90+%] is and continues to be conducted by those from a mental health background and/or with a specific interest or concern with mental health issues, the majority has been conducted by academics and practitioners with apparently little or no practical experience of working in, operating in, or appreciation of, the circumstances and issues associated with other Care settings.

This means that the belief currently exists that any solutions, training and/or methodologies designed for a mental health environment and patient group will automatically and inevitably seamlessly work if transferred to another Care setting, such as an educational setting or acute hospital environment. Again, long and hard experience has proven this to be a fallacy.

BILD, the RRN and its acolytes are at the forefront of this belief and have been pushing this agenda at the highest levels of the Care decision making apparatus within England, unfortunately with apparent success, for several years.

The Restraint Reduction Network Timeline

The question then arises ‘who are the RRN’ and what authority do they possess to impose their training standards on anyone? What follows in this section is short timeline and explanation as to the first part of the question posed above.


  • 21st July 2008: The Health and Social Care Act 2008 receives Royal Assent with effective implementation from September the same year. This authorises [Sections 1 through 97] the formation of the Care Quality Commissions, with a remit to regulate activity within health and social care in England only with specific responsibility to “to protect and promote the health, safety and welfare of people who use health and social care services”. [it should be noted that there is no mention of any responsibility to protect and promote the health, safety and welfare of those who provide the care].
  • 3rd September 2010: Mr Olaseni Lewis dies whilst being restrained by 11 Police Officers in Bethlam Royal Hospital [BRH], after being confined, initially, as an informal admission before being sectioned. The later Coroner’s Inquest held in May 2017 criticised both the Metropolitan Police training programme and the lack of understanding and training provided to staff at BRH by its parent organisation South London & Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust. This incident led to a Bill [later passed as the Mental Health (Use of Force) Act 2018] being placed before Parliament to address the issues highlighted at the subsequent Coroner inquest.
  • Mid-2000’s: Work commenced within the NHS under the auspices of LSMS’s and NHSP to produce a set of training guidelines relating to restraint. What subsequently was produced differs hugely from what was initially envisaged and produced.
  • Mid-2014: The private sector training organisation the ‘Crisis Prevention Institute’ [CPI] co-found the Restraint Reduction Network [RRN] to facilitate the spread of best practise & guidance on restraint reduction.
  • 19th July 2017: Mental Health Units [Use of Force] bill placed before Parliament [initially the CQC was tasked with developing the training standards within their authority pursuant to Sec.20 of the HSCA 2008. However, the Secretary of State for Health then assumed responsibility for doing so, before handing it off to Health Education England who quickly abrogated responsibility by handing it off and tasking the private sector RRN with developing the appropriate standards].
  • 1st November 2018: Mental Health Units [Use of Force] Act 2018 [MHUUoFA] receives Royal assent and becomes law.
  • 30th April 2019: HEE announces that UKAS has been commissioned to establish ‘Accredited Certification’ for the RRN to oversee and authorise training organisation to exclusively design, introduce and run restraint training programmes in line with the RRNTS.
  • Early 2019: British Institute for Learning Difficulties [BILD] assumes responsibility for the stewardship and facilitation of the RRN.
  • April 2019: BILD RRN launches the 1st version of the Restraint Reduction Network Training Standards [RRNTS?]. BILD forms a number of separate [Charitable] organisations; BILD Restraint Reduction Network [BILD RRN], BILD Association of Certified Training [BILD ACT] , which is licensed by BILD RRN to use the RRNTS and deliver the RRN Certification Scheme.
  • April 2020 [delayed to April 2021 due to Covid Pandemic]: Providers of NHS commissioned services of Mental Health & Learning Difficulties services + providers of MH secure services ‘required’ to only use RRN approved and certified training services in ‘restrictive’ (i.e. restraint) practices.
  • 7th December 2021: Mental Health Units [Use of Force] Act 2018 Statutory Guidance published and takes effect.
  • The long awaited and promised RRNTS Version 2, specifically re-written to encompass the Acute Sector as well as Social Care and the Education Sectors is due for release. This was originally due and was promised to be released in September/October 2023 but has yet to be seen. What it contains has been a closely guarded secret to-date. Regardless of what the next version states or claims, one must remember that there has been no change to the Act nor the accompanying Statutory Guidance.

Where does the authority come from that permits and/or allows the RRN to impose it training standards on specific care organisations and does that remit extend beyond the limited scope of the statutory guidance?

Legal Framework, Issues and Concerns

Before looking at the specific legal framework surrounding the RRNTS it should be remembered that the laws that apply to any use of force to restrain individual(s) has not been changed, amended, or affected, by the introduction of the Mental Health (Use of Force) Act 2018, nor its associated Statutory Guidance.

The law that permits a person to use force on another is divided between the Common Law and Statute [Legislation]. This topic its covered at length on our BTEC Advanced Restraint Instructor Award.

The MHUUoFA 2018 is a relatively short piece of legislation, consisting of 11 pages containing 17 sections, of which the most relevant for the purposes of this paper are as follows:

  • Section 2 – Appointment of a ‘Responsible Person
  • Section 3 – Policy on Use of Force
  • Section 4 – Information about Use of Force
  • Section 5 – Training in Appropriate Use of Force
  • Section 6 – Recording of Use of Force
  • Section 11 – Guidance about Functions under this Act

What is singularly and obviously absent from this legislation is any mention of the RRN, their training standards and/or what kind of specific training is required and who is authorised to conduct or provide it. What is also glaringly obvious is the statutes remit and application. The language used is both plain and explicit. It applies to in-patient Mental Health Units. There is zero mention of any other sector! Please remember that fact.

The requirement for the Secretary of State for Health to provide statutory guidance to fill in the blanks was set out in Section 11. This was not a quick process. It was originally intended to introduce the statutory guidance in early 2020, however, the covid pandemic prevented this from occurring. In the meantime, to cover the gap between the publication of both documents, the NHS Standard Contract 2020-21 was amended to compel MH Service Providers and Units to comply with the provisions set out in the statute. The same provision was to be found in the NHS Standard Contract 2021-22. However, by the time that the NHS Standard Contract 2022-23 was introduced, this requirement had been deleted. It was believed that this deletion was because on 7th December 2021 the Mental Health Units (Use of Force) Act 2018 Statutory Guidance had taken effect.

However, the issue was more problematic. Rather than introduce a new service condition a decision was made to utilise the Service Development & Improvement Plan [SDIP] methodology to implement the change [see NHS Standard Contract 2020-21 – Technical Guidance Sec.41 for definition and applications of an SDIP]. This methodology requires commissioners of services and providers of services to work out a contractual requirement to implement changes required to improve the service.

Unfortunately, whoever chose this methodology failed to either read and/or understand the implications of Section 41[6] of the NHS Standard Contract 2020-21 – Technical Guidance. In plain terms this stated that if the new service to be introduced was significantly more expensive than what was already provided it need not be introduced or implemented.

The new 58-page Statutory Guidance, like the actual Statute, is explicit in its terminology, in that it applies exclusively to mental health units. Pages 15-16 defines the types of inpatient service which would be considered within the definition of a mental health unit.

They are as follows:

  • Acute mental health wards for adults of working age and psychiatric intensive care units
  • Long stay or rehabilitation mental health wards for working age adults
  • Forensic inpatient or secure wards (low, medium and high)
  • Child and adolescent mental health wards
  • Wards for older people with mental health problems
  • Wards for people with autism or a learning disability
  • Specialist mental health eating disorder services
  • Inpatient mother and baby units
  • Acute hospital wards where patients are “detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 for assessment and treatment of their mental disorder”

The next section covers those services that are deemed to be outside of the definition of a mental health unit and to which the requirements, as stipulated in both the statute and the statutory regulation, would not apply:

  • Accident and emergency departments of emergency departments
  • Section 135 and 136 suites that are outside of a mental health unit
  • Outpatient departments or clinics
  • Mental health transport vehicles

In addition to the elements mentioned above anything not specifically included would therefore be excluded.

It is very useful to note that on page 13 of the regulations under the section defining the ‘legal status of this statutory guidance’ it states:

‘Both the ‘responsible person’ and staff working in mental health units ‘must have regard’ to this guidance.’

Like all things legal, specific words and phrases possess precise meaning. In the case of the term ‘have regard to’ the Courts have opined on the definition in multiple cases. For instance:

“’have regard” … [means] take the … Guidance into account and if they decide to depart from it, they must have and give “clear reasons” for doing so …’have regard to’ involves a greater degree of consideration than merely to ‘consult’ … but plainly does not mean … ‘follow’, or ‘slavishly obey’.

This would clearly indicate that providing your organisation can demonstrate that it factored in the requirements and provisions of the RRNTS, but chose to retain a suitable viable and appropriate alternative (non-certified) restraint provider to cater for a very specific requirement, such as training staff to conduct restraint in NG/PEG feeding circumstances, it could legitimately do so.

Since 2019, the CQC [as well as the RRN, HEE and Skills for Care] have been actively pushing the erroneous agenda and issuing letters to the effect that it is mandatory for all restraint training provision with Care to fall within the auspices of the RRNTS.

However, when actively challenged as to this assertion they have responded by stating [in writing on multiple occasions], in words to the effect that:

‘Whilst sectors out with (those mentioned in the guidance) do NOT currently fall within the requirements of the RRNTS , they would like to see that change in the future.’

This is nothing more than an aspiration, and a disappointing one at that.

The second element that should be both recognised, appreciated and taken into consideration when determining if a BILD ACT certified training provider is appropriate to supply restraint training for your organisation commensurate with the identified risks is that the RRNTS does not ‘approve’ or ‘sign-off’ on any restrictive tertiary practises [i.e. physical techniques, interventions, or systems] but limits/confines itself to dealing with primary, secondary and non-restrictive tertiary practises.

This is not commonly known and certainly is not broadcast by the RRN, however, when challenged to confirm this the BILD RRN Chairperson, Ben Higgins, has admitted this to be the case.

This means that, as currently constituted, the RRNTS and any restraint training provider certified by BILD ACT, does not address or provide active or workable solutions for the most volatile and dangerous situations staff may face within their workplace.


The RRNTS were specifically written for a narrow working environment, namely in-patient MH settings. Unfortunately, as a result of active misinformation, disinformation, obfuscation and occasional outright lies, by some involved in promoting and pushing the BILD/RRN agenda, the key decision makers in many Careorganisations, including within a growing number of Acute Trusts and outside of the narrow, limited, MH remit [as provided for by the statutory guidance], have been led to believe that they have no choice other than to acquire their restraint training provision from RRN certified training providers.

In the event this continues, BILD and its satellite organisations, will have succeeded, with the active participation of the regulatory authorities, in monopolising all restraint training within the wider Care setting in England.

This has already resulted in the costs of the provision of restraint training increasing dramatically, whilst offering no safer outcomes when it is applied outside of its core remit.

Information is available that indicates that the forthcoming introduction of ‘version 2’ of the RRNTS, rumoured to become active in September 2024 and believed to have been written with the express purpose of encompassing not just all healthcare sectors, but also extending its remit to social care and the education sector, as well as across the whole of the UK, should be of grave concern for all involved in those sectors.

Should it succeed in doing so it would remove any choice that an organisation would have to determine its own training needs and requirements, based on its understanding and appreciation of the risks the organisation, its staff, patients and service users face.

Jim Snipe offered some additional relevant history regarding BILD and that BILD were responsible for an earlier accreditation scheme: “The BILD accreditation scheme”.

This scheme was initially launched in 2002, with revisions in 2006, 2010 and 2014.

A Panorama investigation, broadcast on television in 2011, exposed the physical and psychological abuse suffered by people with learning disabilities and challenging behaviour at hospital, we refer, of course to Winterbourne View.

A further Panorama investigation in 2019, at Whorlton Hall, unfortunately showed similar forms of abuse from care staff to vulnerable people.

The organisation that provided training to both teams in the exposes, was BILD accredited!

This article is not in any way accusing the training provider of being responsible for the staff behaviour. The organisation is a reputable worldwide provider and is very respected.

It is, however, important to highlight that regardless of the accredited training, the RRN/BILD cannot reasonably state that their scheme protects vulnerable adults by virtue of the provider bearing their kite mark.

Christopher Alexander, Clinical Risk and Public Health Consultant, states that the systemic failings in care services transcend beyond isolated incidents, revealing a concerning pattern of inadequate safeguarding measures and inappropriate training ‘sector wide’.

Adopting standardised operational risk mitigation and safety interventions, often through accreditation schemes, has paradoxically led to a disabling effect on service provider’s ability to make suitable and sufficient risk assessments.

This standardisation, driven by market and reputational factors rather than genuine safety concerns, often results in a one-size-fits-all approach that fails to address the unique needs of individual care settings and their vulnerable clients.

Service providers find themselves implementing interventions not because they are the most effective or appropriate but because they align with arbitrary accreditation requirements.

This approach directly contradicts the principles of ‘safe systems of work’ and ‘safe working practices’, as outlined in the Health and Safety at Work Act. And also, CQC Regulatory Standard 19, which outlines that Inspectors will always apply a proportionate and risk-based approach when inspecting under this regulation.

Further, organisations that prioritise accreditation over practical safety measures may inadvertently breach their duty of care to clients and staff.

The Children’s Commissioner for England’s’ statement in the ICARS report outlines the pervasive nature of these issues, to quote:

“My office is investigating how safeguarding concerns are handled, particularly involving vulnerable children – because we have seen that sadly this is not an isolated issue.”

This acknowledgement confirms that the problems exposed at Life Wirral School represent wider, systemic issues in safeguarding vulnerable individuals.

Evidently, organisations are expending large sums on what essentially amounts to policies, practices, and operational procedures that often disregard their unique operational contexts. This one size fits all approach frequently results in the implementation of practices ill-suited to the specific needs and challenges of individual settings for the purpose of accreditation and market factors.

Such misalignment fails to enhance safety and effectiveness and diverts valuable funds from developing tailored, context-specific interventions that could better address the actual risks and needs of both staff and their clients.

We hope this post is useful and informative.

If you wish to contact us for any further information, please click ‘here’.

Relevant Links

Please note, some of these are historic and precede the 2021 Statutory Guidance, however, are included here for historic relevance and to offer the reader the opportunity for greater levels of knowledge and understanding. There will also be other relevant links contained within the posts themselves:

25th June 2024 – ICARS Report:


17th June 2024 – BBC Panorama broadcast ‘Undercover School: Cruelty in the classroom’:


19th June 2023 – Children, Pain-Compliance and RRN:


25th November 2022 – Why the RRN doesn’t apply to schools:


12th July 2021 – RRN, Mandatory or Not?:


28th September 2020 – Why the RRNTS are unworkable:


31st May 2020 – CQC inspectors are not trained in restraint (FOI):


30th October 2019 – Profits before safety:


14th October 2019 – NFPS will not be adopting the RRNTS – 2:


12th July 2019 – NFPS will not be adopting the RRNTS – 1: